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Demonstrators rally near the military headquarters in Khartoum, April
2019.
As Sudan’s military rulers and the pro-democracy coalition of Forces for
Freedom and Change (FFC) resume their fraught negotiations over the
composition of a civilian government, real power is being transacted
according to a different logic—the political marketplace.
A political marketplace analysis of Sudan is an important tool for
democracy activists in Sudan to understand the power base of the
forces they are confronting. Otherwise the leaders of the FFC risk
 nding themselves with formal responsibility for a political apparatus,
which runs according to a set of logics they simply cannot control.
The deputy chair of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and de facto
ruler of Sudan, General Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, is energetically
cutting political- nancial deals to stay on top of the country’s
tumultuous politics. His is using money from the Gulf and gold trading
to try to buy enough loyalty to subordinate or eliminate rivals. Hemedti’s
immediate challenges arise from members of the ousted establishment
who fear his rule and what it entails. He also faces a looming political-
economic crisis—that cannot be solved while he remains dependent on
his current sources of political  nancing.
The occasional paper, Sudan: A Political Marketplace Analysis analyses
the development of the country’s political economy and political market
since independence, with particular attention to its last three phases:
the oil-based centralised kleptocracy of the 1999-2011 period; the post-
oil transition to a political market funded largely by gold, smuggling and
mercenarism; and the situation today following the April revolution. The
key lessons are that the shift from oil-based rentierism to reliance on
licit and illicit gold sales and hiring out troops to  ght in Yemen, shifted
the  nancial basis of power from the National Congress Party
establishment to Gen. Hemedti and his paramilitary Rapid Support
Forces (RSF).
Both types of rentierism undermined Sudan’s long-term economic
development. But reliance on gold and mercenarism also generated a
new model of political  nancing, in which Sudan’s macroeconomic
policy (and especially the activities of the Central Bank) had to be
subordinated to political market calculations. The key decision taken
was that, in order to ensure that small-scale gold traders, who buy gold
from artisanal miners, sell it to o cial channels and don’t smuggle it
across the border, the Central Bank of Sudan would purchase the gold
at an in ated price in Sudanese pounds—and print money to fund this.
The result is in ation, which deprives wage-earners in the towns and in
the commercial agricultural areas, and which rewards the paramilitaries
and associated traders who control gold and foreign exchange.
Since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April, this political
market power con guration has not changed. In fact, it has intensi ed.
The TMC-FFC negotiations deal only with the façade issues of the
composition of the civilian organs of government and not the real
sources of power: who controls the gold, the foreign exchange, and the
guns. A civilian government emerging from today’s negotiations would
be impotent to address Sudan’s real problems.
Meanwhile, the crux of the Hemedti regime’s predicament lies in the
fact that its strategy for managing power by exchanging material
rewards for allegiance can work for the short term, but only at the cost
of accelerating the political-economic dynamics that brought down
Pres. al-Bashir. The cash bailouts that the regime is receiving from
Saudi Arabia and the UAE aren’t enough to square the circle of meeting
his own needs for political payouts and also stabilising the economy.
In fact, the material basis for the civic uprising—the impoverishment of
millions of people—is getting worse. Alongside continuing high-pro le
human rights violations by the RSF and other security forces, this
continues to give the FFC enormous credibility and leverage when it
brings people on to the streets.
The challenge for the civilian administration is not who is represented,
but what is the reform agenda? Does it have political acceptance? And
can it be implemented? There are three key sets of issues that need to
be resolved prior to establishing a credible civilian executive.
The  rst is political buy-in to  xing the economy. This is where the
political marketplace analysis is crucial.
At present, Gen. Hemedti is making the Government of Sudan
subordinate to his transnational mercenary and gold business. While
this power hierarchy prevails, Sudan cannot achieve economic
stabilisation or democracy.
Technocratic reform will require winning a political contest. That
requires convening the business sector, the Middle Eastern sponsors,
and the donors and international  nancial institutions to agree on a
plan. This will demand taking control of  scal and monetary policy by a
strong Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and making the
Central Bank of Sudan a tool for a technocratic government, not a mint
for the dominant faction. Key to success will be for the Gulf states to
recognise that Sudan’s economic stability (and also the viability of their
own investments in agriculture, industry and trade) depends upon them
taking a different approach to funding Hemedti and the TMC, and
regulating Sudan’s gold trade as well.
The second is an inclusive peace process—a longstanding demand,
based on historical inequalities in power and wealth. This isn’t a
political marketplace challenge, though the regime will try to use divide-
and-rule and monetary payoffs to achieve something that looks like a
peace deal. The leaders of the armed groups have seen this before and
aren’t likely to succumb. Nor will peace in Darfur, Southern Kordofan
and Blue Nile be achieved by the FFC forming a civilian government and
asking the armed groups to join. The leaders of the armed groups
resent this condescension: they may disagree tactically and be prone to
division, but they share the same fundamental concerns.
Third is stabilising the security arena. Conventional security sector
reform cannot be achieved without a consolidated security sector,
which does not exist. In fact, the paramilitary RSF is today the dominant
actor, with the army subordinate and the National Intelligence and
Security Service vanquished. The RSF is emerging as a transnational
military-commercial business enterprise. However, it has neither the
power nor the legitimacy to enforce its writ. The numerous security
actors (military, paramilitary, armed groups, militia) can only implement
a set of security reforms by consensus. Some form of council of all
military actors will be necessary.
Read more in the World Peace Foundation and Con ict Research
Programme’s occasional paper Sudan: A Political Marketplace
Framework Analysis.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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